Upgrade barman-cloud library to v0.5.1 which includes lz4 support for
base backups. Update CRD schema and manifest to expose lz4 as a valid
compression option, and clarify docs that lz4 is no longer WAL-only.
Closes#867
Signed-off-by: Marco Nenciarini <marco.nenciarini@enterprisedb.com>
Signed-off-by: Leonardo Cecchi <leonardo.cecchi@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Leonardo Cecchi <leonardo.cecchi@gmail.com>
This PR contains the following updates:
| Package | Change |
[Age](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |
[Confidence](https://docs.renovatebot.com/merge-confidence/) |
|---|---|---|---|
| [google.golang.org/grpc](https://redirect.github.com/grpc/grpc-go) |
`v1.79.2` → `v1.79.3` |
|
|
### GitHub Vulnerability Alerts
####
[CVE-2026-33186](https://redirect.github.com/grpc/grpc-go/security/advisories/GHSA-p77j-4mvh-x3m3)
### Impact
_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_
It is an **Authorization Bypass** resulting from **Improper Input
Validation** of the HTTP/2 `:path` pseudo-header.
The gRPC-Go server was too lenient in its routing logic, accepting
requests where the `:path` omitted the mandatory leading slash (e.g.,
`Service/Method` instead of `/Service/Method`). While the server
successfully routed these requests to the correct handler, authorization
interceptors (including the official `grpc/authz` package) evaluated the
raw, non-canonical path string. Consequently, "deny" rules defined using
canonical paths (starting with `/`) failed to match the incoming
request, allowing it to bypass the policy if a fallback "allow" rule was
present.
**Who is impacted?**
This affects gRPC-Go servers that meet both of the following criteria:
1. They use path-based authorization interceptors, such as the official
RBAC implementation in `google.golang.org/grpc/authz` or custom
interceptors relying on `info.FullMethod` or `grpc.Method(ctx)`.
2. Their security policy contains specific "deny" rules for canonical
paths but allows other requests by default (a fallback "allow" rule).
The vulnerability is exploitable by an attacker who can send raw HTTP/2
frames with malformed `:path` headers directly to the gRPC server.
### Patches
_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_
Yes, the issue has been patched. The fix ensures that any request with a
`:path` that does not start with a leading slash is immediately rejected
with a `codes.Unimplemented` error, preventing it from reaching
authorization interceptors or handlers with a non-canonical path string.
Users should upgrade to the following versions (or newer):
* **v1.79.3**
* The latest **master** branch.
It is recommended that all users employing path-based authorization
(especially `grpc/authz`) upgrade as soon as the patch is available in a
tagged release.
### Workarounds
_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without
upgrading?_
While upgrading is the most secure and recommended path, users can
mitigate the vulnerability using one of the following methods:
#### 1. Use a Validating Interceptor (Recommended Mitigation)
Add an "outermost" interceptor to your server that validates the path
before any other authorization logic runs:
```go
func pathValidationInterceptor(ctx context.Context, req any, info *grpc.UnaryServerInfo, handler grpc.UnaryHandler) (any, error) {
if info.FullMethod == "" || info.FullMethod[0] != '/' {
return nil, status.Errorf(codes.Unimplemented, "malformed method name")
}
return handler(ctx, req)
}
// Ensure this is the FIRST interceptor in your chain
s := grpc.NewServer(
grpc.ChainUnaryInterceptor(pathValidationInterceptor, authzInterceptor),
)
```
#### 2. Infrastructure-Level Normalization
If your gRPC server is behind a reverse proxy or load balancer (such as
Envoy, NGINX, or an L7 Cloud Load Balancer), ensure it is configured to
enforce strict HTTP/2 compliance for pseudo-headers and reject or
normalize requests where the `:path` header does not start with a
leading slash.
#### 3. Policy Hardening
Switch to a "default deny" posture in your authorization policies
(explicitly listing all allowed paths and denying everything else) to
reduce the risk of bypasses via malformed inputs.
---
### Release Notes
<details>
<summary>grpc/grpc-go (google.golang.org/grpc)</summary>
###
[`v1.79.3`](https://redirect.github.com/grpc/grpc-go/releases/tag/v1.79.3):
Release 1.79.3
[Compare
Source](https://redirect.github.com/grpc/grpc-go/compare/v1.79.2...v1.79.3)
### Security
- server: fix an authorization bypass where malformed :path headers
(missing the leading slash) could bypass path-based restricted "deny"
rules in interceptors like `grpc/authz`. Any request with a
non-canonical path is now immediately rejected with an `Unimplemented`
error.
([#​8981](https://redirect.github.com/grpc/grpc-go/issues/8981))
</details>
---
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Update github.com/cloudnative-pg/barman-cloud from the pre-release pin
(ced266c) to the official v0.5.0 release.
This update fixes a race condition in parallel WAL restore where
prefetched files could be read while still being downloaded, causing
PostgreSQL recovery to fail with "invalid checkpoint record" errors. It
also fixes a misleading "missing Azure credentials" error message when
no object store credentials are defined at all.
Signed-off-by: Marco Nenciarini <marco.nenciarini@enterprisedb.com>
This commit adds support for the DefaultAzureCredential authentication
mechanism in Azure Blob Storage. Users can now use the
`useDefaultAzureCredentials` option to enable Azure's default credential
chain, which automatically discovers and uses available credentials in
the following order
1. Environment Variables (Service Principal)
2. Managed Identity
3. Azure CLI
4. Azure PowerShell
This is particularly useful when running on Azure Kubernetes Service
(AKS) with Workload Identity, eliminating the need to explicitly store
credentials in Kubernetes Secrets.
Signed-off-by: Armando Ruocco <armando.ruocco@enterprisedb.com>
Signed-off-by: Gabriele Fedi <gabriele.fedi@enterprisedb.com>
Signed-off-by: Marco Nenciarini <marco.nenciarini@enterprisedb.com>
Co-authored-by: Gabriele Fedi <gabriele.fedi@enterprisedb.com>
Co-authored-by: Marco Nenciarini <marco.nenciarini@enterprisedb.com>
This change fixes Azure credentials validation to require a storage
account when using explicit credentials such as a storage key or SAS
token, and ensures the connection string is mutually exclusive with
other authentication parameters.
Closes#705
Related: cloudnative-pg/barman-cloud#177
Signed-off-by: Marco Nenciarini <marco.nenciarini@enterprisedb.com>
Update the machinery dependency to include the fix that ensures
RFC3339-like timestamps without timezone (e.g., "2024-01-15T10:30:00")
are interpreted as UTC.
The documentation has been updated to use a targetTime example with an
explicit Z suffix and to clarify that RFC3339-like timestamps without timezone
are interpreted as UTC.
Closes#699
Signed-off-by: Marco Nenciarini <marco.nenciarini@enterprisedb.com>
Signed-off-by: Armando Ruocco <armando.ruocco@enterprisedb.com>
Co-authored-by: Armando Ruocco <armando.ruocco@enterprisedb.com>
